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The present copyright law is obsolete in many respects. Particularly,
our dual system of common law and statutory protection, the
measuring of the duration of copyright on the basis of two terms
running from publication, the requirement of notice, the doctrine of
"fair use", and the application of the law to various methods of
transmission and data processing are matters calling for statutory
clarification and revision. The author summarizes the effect of the
copyright law revision bill now before Congress upon these and
other copyright problems.
I. THE NEED FOR REvISION
To those not already aware of the fact, it may come as a surprise
to learn that the copyright law of the United States has not been
changed in its essential features since 1909.1
There may be a few hardy souls of great-grandfatherly age who
know better, but we of less venerable memory feel sure that the prob-
lems of organized society were far simpler in the first decade of the
twentieth century. We are ready to accept the premise that legal
structures designed in that bygone era are not adequate to accommodate
the new mechanisms and changed ways that have become our daily
environment. With its convulsions of two world wars, a profound
economic depression, political and economic upheavals in a large part
of the globe, and revolutionary explosions of knowledge and technology,
the past half century, we think, has wrought greater changes in our
way of life, now and for the near future, than any like period in several
milleniums.
These observations are pertinent to our present copyright law.
Technological innovation is nowhere more apparent than in the means
used to reproduce and communicate the words, sounds, and images by
which human thought and feelings are expressed. Who in 1909 dreamed
of radio or television, electrostatic and offset copying machines or mag-
netic tape recording and videotape; of computer storage, printout, and
image reproduction, facsimile transmission or communications satel-
* General Counsel of the Copyright Office. The views expressed in this article are
those of the author personally and do not necessarily reflect those of the Copyright
Office. The author wishes to make this article freely available for reproduction in whole
or in part.
1 The present copyright law is title 17 of the United States Code, which is a codifi-
cation of the Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, with subsequent amendments.
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lites? How many, even, were the prophets who then foresaw that the
"flickers" of the nickelodeon and the scratchy recordings heard on the
graphophone or talking machine would grow into major producers and
consumers of the world's literature, music, and art?
It is easy, perhaps, to exaggerate the obsolescence of the 1909 law.
To bring the picture into proper perspective, it needs to be said that
while the philosophical foundations of the copyright system embodied
in the 1909 law (and its predecessors) are occasionally challenged,
they are still thought to be basically sound; the new model is being
built on much the same principles. Moreover, the drafters of the old
law were wise in formulating it, for the most part, in terms of broad
conceptual import, which has allowed the courts much of the room
needed to fit new pieces into the statutory pattern.
Nevertheless, that pattern itself is now considered deficient in a
number of respects. For one, we lag behind the other advanced countries
in the protection we accord to writers, composers, and artists. In a
shrinking world, where the international dissemination of the works of
authors is increasingly important, the fundamental points at which our
copyright system remains at variance with the system prevalent abroad
become obstacles to cultural exchange.
I shall not attempt to catalog all the deficiences of the present
statute (and one man's bate noir may, of course, be another's sacred
cow), but a few prime examples should be enough to show that the 1909
statute is outmoded. In addition, some of the important instances will
be cited of new questions to which the application of the old statute is
uncertain, calling for clarification, at least, in a revision of the statute.
Finally, due in part to the complexity of some of its provisions, in part
to patchwork amendments made during the legislative process, and in
part to the judicial gloss needed to adapt its terms to changed condi-
tions, the existing statute is replete with language that lends itself to
uncertainty, confusion, or misconception; 2 this alone would be enough
to warrant rewriting the law.
A. Publication as Point of Inception
Historically, copyright was an offspring of the printing press. It
came into being as the means of giving an authorized printer the ex-
clusive right to print and publish copies. The author could control the
authorization of the first printing and publication by keeping physical
possession of his manuscript until he chose to have it published; the
common law recognized the author's right to keep his writings private,
2 Some prime examples are §§ 1, 16, and 101(b) of 17 U.S.C.
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under the rubric of "literary property" or the "right of first publica-
tion." But once the work was published, anyone could print and
publish additional copies; to restrain them required the creation by law
of an exclusive right in the author or authorized printer. So grew up in
England, as part of the American heritage, the dual system of common
law "literary property" before publication and statutory "copyright"
thereafter.3
The copyright system of the United States still maintains this
dualism. Until a work has been published, any unauthorized use that
discloses it to the public violates the author's literary property rights
under the common law. Upon publication, the common law rights cease
and protection of the work thereafter depends upon copyright under
the federal statute.4
As required by the Constitution, statutory copyright is limited to a
specified period of time; but as long as a work remains unpublished,
the common law rights continue indefinitely. This and other differences
between common law and statutory protection were valid when publica-
tion by printing and distributing copies was virtually the only means
of disseminating works to the public at large. For most purposes,
however, the rationale for protecting works on different bases before
and after publication has been destroyed by the development of other
methods of wide public dissemination, notably through aural recordings
and broadcasting and other transmissions. The dual system was
abandoned long ago by the United Kingdom and other British Common-
wealth countries in favor of a unified system of statutory copyright.
Moreover, archival collections of manuscripts have become im-
portant sources of material for historians and scholars, who are often
inhibited in their use of these manuscripts by the existence of literary
property rights. The considerations of privacy that gave rise to the
common law protection of unpublished works do not require that the
literary property rights of authors in their manuscripts continue in
their heirs forever, as is now the case, at least in theory, under the
common law.
3 The fascinating evolution of this dual system in England can be traced in the
celebrated cases of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr 2302 (K.B. 1769) and Donaldson v. Becket,
4 Burr 2408 (H.L. 1774).
4 The American counterpart of Donaldson v. Becket, supra note 3, is Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). For a general discussion of the subject see Strauss,
"Protection of Unpublished Works" (1957), Study No. 29 in Copyright Law Revision
Studies, a series of Committee Prints of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 86th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1960-61) [this series hereinafter cited as Copyright Law Revision
Studies].
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B. Duration of Copyright
The first copyright statute, enacted in England in 1710,1 was
designed to assure that the author or authorized printer of a work could
retain, for a specified period of time after its first publication, the right
to prevent others from making and publishing copies. An essential
feature of the statute was the time limitation on the new post-
publication right; and since the statutory right came into being upon
publication, it was logical to have the time period run from that event.
Ultimately the historic case of Donaldson v. Becket' decided that the
statute alone, and not the common law, provided protection after
publication, so that all copyright protection terminated at the end of the
time period specified in the statute.
The concept of a limited period of copyright protection for authors
was embedded in the Constitution of the United States,7 and the copy-
right statute enacted by the First Congress in 17908 followed the pre-
cedent of the mother country in fixing a term of years measured from
publication.
Almost immediately afterward, France, sparked by her Revolution,
led the way for continental Europe in enacting decrees for the protec-
tion of the rights of authors.' The French pattern, unrestrained by the
common law tradition, was influenced more by concern for the pro-
tection of the author as a creative individual, and less by the event of
publication as a focal point. The French decrees adopted the concept
of limited duration, but provided that the author's rights should endure
for his lifetime.
Almost all countries, including the United Kingdom and the other
members of the British Commonwealth, have since adopted a copyright
term running for the life of the author and a number of years after his
death.'0 The United States is almost alone in having its basic term
measured still from publication.
C. The Renewal System
Another feature of the United States law borrowed from the
English statute of 1710, and still with us, is the two-term system:
5 8 Anne ch. 19.
6 Supra note 3.
7 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers the Congress to secure exclusive
rights to authors and inventors in their writings and discoveries "for limited times."
8 1 Stat. 124 (1790), which provided for a term of 14 years from publication, re-
newable for a further term of 14 years.
9 Decrees of July 19-August 6, 1791, and July 19-24, 1793.
10 See Guinan, "Duration of Copyright" (1957), Study No. 30 in Copyright Law
Revision Studies.
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copyright endures initially for a period of years (now 28) from the date
of publication, and may be renewed by certain persons for a further
period of years (also now 28)."l Here too we are at odds with the rest
of the world. Moreover, the renewal provisions of the present law have
been a prolific breeder of litigation, and, in a significant number of
instances, they have deprived authors or their successors of substantial
benefits they would have enjoyed but for an inadvertent failure to renew
in due time.
One of the major objects of -the renewal system has been to give
authors, or the members of a deceased author's family, an opportunity,
at the end of the first term, to recapture the rights they had originally
assigned to publishers and other users of their works, and to make new
contracts for exploitation during the second term. The present renewal
provisions have proven unsatisfactory in this respect on both sides. It
has fallen short in its objective of protecting authors against unfair
bargains, and it has subjected assignees to the uncertainties of gambling
against the death of the author (or other prospective beneficiaries of
the renewal right) during the first term. If the renewal system is to be
abolished, a different device, seeking equity on both sides, will be needed
to accomplish the purpose.
D. Procedural Requirements for Protection
Our present statute requires, as a condition of copyright protec-
tion, that a prescribed notice of copyright be placed on published
copies of the work.'" In addition, the deposit of copies as published,
together with the registration of a claim of copyright, is a prerequisite
to maintaining an infringement suit;' 3 but, although the statute says
that deposit "shall be [made] promptly" after publication, the courts
have held that delaying the deposit until an infringement suit is
instituted, years later, does not affect the copyright (except in a case
where a formal demand for the deposit is made by the Register of
Copyrights and is not complied with)."
The general requirement of a copyright notice in published copies
has been dropped from most foreign laws, though some still call for a
11 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1947). For a comprehensive analysis of the renewal system see
Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright" (1960), Study No. 31 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
12 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19, 20 (1947). For a general discussion of the notice provisions
see Doyle, Cary, McCannon, and Ringer, "Notice of Copyright" (1957), Study No. 7 in
Copyright Law Revision Studies.
13 17 U.S.C. §§ 11-14 (1947). For a general discussion of the registration system see
Kaplan, "The Registration of Copyright" (195S), Study No. 17 in Copyright Law Revi-
sion Studies.
14 Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
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notice on certain kinds of works (e.g., articles in periodicals, photo-
graphs, sound recordings). However, the use of a specified form of
notice as a device for international protection has been sanctioned by
the Universal Copyright Convention.1 r
While author interests have recommended elimination of the notice
requirement in the revision of the United States statute, the retention
of such a requirement has staunch advocates, particularly among
scholarly, educational and research groups. But even the latter concede
that the notice provisions of the present statute are too rigid and often
work injustices inasmuch as they cause forfeitures of copyright because
of inadvertent or technical omissions or errors.
As for registration, few countries have a full-scale system com-
parable to that in the United States. The deposit of copies of published
materials for the enrichment of national libraries is a common require-
ment in foreign countries; but, except for those countries where deposit
is made in conjunction with registration, the deposit requirement is
disassociated from copyright protection.
Retention of a comprehensive system of deposit and registration is
favored by virtually all groups concerned in the United States, though
not as a condition of copyright protection in any event. A number of
changes in the operation of the present system, however, are generally
thought desirable to produce a more complete and reliable record, or
will be necessary to conform with changes in the general structure of the
statute.
E. The Manufacturing Clause
A feature of the present law that his long been bitterly attacked,
both at home and abroad, is the so-called "manufacturing clause". In
simplified summary, it requires that English-language books and peri-
odicals by American authors must be printed in the United States.
If printed and published abroad, ad interim copyright protection for
five years may be secured by a special registration, but all copyright
protection ceases at the end of the five years unless another edition is
printed and published in the United States in the meantime.16
It is difficult to see any logical reason why the copyright protection
of authors should be dependent upon the domestic manufacture of copies.
The present manufacturing clause is an ameliorated version of the
clause as originally written into the 1891 statute1 7 which provided, for
the first time, for the extension of copyright to foreign works on a basis
15 Universal Copyright Convention Art. MI, para. 1.
16 17 U.S.C. §§ 16-18, 22, 23 (1947).
17 Ch. 565, § 3, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).
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of reciprocity. The requirement of domestic manufacture was the
political price exacted by the American printers for the withdrawal of
their opposition to the international copyright provisions of the 1891
act. They feared the loss of the employment they had enjoyed in
printing copies, for the American market, of foreign works which had
theretofore not been protected by copyright in the United States.
The economic position of American printers, if it required their
special protection against foreign competition in 1891 and for some time
thereafter, has since been turned about. In the earlier years the United
States was a net importer of books; in more recent years exports have
greatly exceeded imports. Nevertheless, the printers still insist that,
because wage rates are materially lower in other countries, they need
the protection afforded by the manufacturing clause. All other groups
concerned, including authors, publishers, and scholarly organizations,
have urged complete elimination of the clause.
F. Copying as Fair Use
The development of machines that will reproduce copyrighted
material quickly and in quantity has aroused much concern and con-
troversy about the application, in this new context, of the old doctrine
of fair use. And it is now evident that the same questions extend to the
storage and retrieval of copyrighted material through computer systems
now in process of development.
The copyright statute makes no mention of fair use; read literally,
it would make any copying without permission an infringement of
copyright. But the courts have recognized that a limited amount of
copying, as in brief quotations, must be allowed in situations where it is
a matter of routine necessity, serves a legitimate purpose, and involves
no substantial encroachment upon the copyright. So the courts, in a
variety of cases over a long period of time, have grafted upon the
statute a judicial doctrine of fair use."8
By its nature, fair use is a general concept of vague dimensions.
Like "due care," for example, it is a rule of reason that cannot be
delineated in exact terms of quantity or quality. Its adaptability to an
endless variety of circumstances has, in fact, been its great practical
virtue. The courts have, however, provided some guidelines. Running
through the cases are pronouncements that, in determining whether any
particular use is permissible as a fair use, the principal factors to be
taken into account are: the nature of the copyrighted work and the use
made of it, the amount and importance of the portion used in relation
I8 The cases are reviewed in Latman, "Fair Use of Copyrighted Works" (1958),
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
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to the whole work, and the likelihood that such uses will affect the
potential market for the work.
Although the fair use doctrine has not been confined to any par-
ticular kinds of uses, the court decisions have dealt mostly with quota-
tions in one work from another for purposes such as criticism, comment,
or illustration. Since the courts have not ruled specifically on the
reproduction of material for use in schools, a group of educational
organizations, in their testimony on the general revision bill introduced
in 1965, expressed grave doubt about relying on the traditional doctrine
of fair use to defend what they considered reasonable copying for school
use. They proposed a special statutory provision to permit copying for
educational purposes under certain conditions. To this the authors and
publishers objected strenuously; the solution, they argued, lies in the
application of the fair use doctrine. 9
Library groups adopted the latter approach in dealing with the
problem of supplying single copies of material in library collections to
researchers. They, as well as authors and publishers, rejected a proposed
statutory provision20 specifying the conditions under which libraries
could supply such copies, and expressed their preference for a statu-
tory affirmation of the fair use doctrine in general terms.
G. Broadcasting and Other Transmissions
1. Nonprofit Performances
The present statute, being of 1909 vintage, makes no reference to
radio or television broadcasting of copyrighted materials. Its provisions
for the right of public performance,2' however, enabled the courts to
apply the statute to performances given in broadcasts. Thus, the old
law proved to be capable of satisfactory adaptation to these new
methods of presenting performances to the public until noncommercial
broadcasting assumed a role of large and growing importance in the
dissemination of copyrighted materials.
The legislators of 1909, thinking of such things as the free concerts
19 The positions taken by the various groups are reflected in the Hearings on Copy-
right Law Revision Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pts. 1-3 (1966). Testimony on any particular sub-
ject or by any particular person or organization can be located from the index at the end
of Part 3 of the Hearings.
20 "Prelminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law § 7," in Copyright Law
Revision, pt. 3, at 6 (Comm. Print, House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1964).
21 17 U.S.C. § 1(c)-(e) (1947). The statutory provisions and case law on the right
of public performance are reviewed in Varmer, "Limitations on Performing Rights"
(1958), Study No. 16 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
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given in the public park on Sunday evenings, excluded from the public
performance right those performances of music that were not "for
profit." Likewise, when the statute was amended in 1952 to extend the
performance right to embrace the public reading or recitation of non-
dramatic literary works (poems, essays, lectures, etc.), the right with
respect to those works was limited to public performances "for profit"
in order to exclude such recitations as those given at school, church, or
civic assemblies.
The "for profit" limitation, enacted as a minor and inconsequential
exception to the public performance right, began to loom large with the
recent and prospective growth of "educational" and other noncom-
mercial broadcasting stations. More and more, the performances in
noncommercial broadcasts are reaching a vast audience, which may in
fact be the principal audience for some kinds of works, or may be much
the same audience as the commercial broadcasters would reach with
the same or similar material. In short, noncommercial broadcasters
have become an important sector of the market for copyrighted works,
and their complete exemption, under the "for profit" limitation, from
any obligation to pay for the use of copyrighted material is hard to
justify.
2. Reproduction Through Image Transmissions
Television-that is, the transmission of images-has created a new
problem that the old law could be construed to cover only by stretching
it to the breaking point. By means of television, anything visually
perceptible-textual matter in books, musical scores, pictures, art
works-can be reproduced in the form of images presented for viewing
by public audiences of any size in any number of places. In principle,
in regard to the rights of authors in the exploitation of their works, the
public display through image reproduction of a work whose function lies
in its visual perception may be considered the equivalent of public
performance of a work whose function lies in being so performed, or
may even be considered the equivalent of supplying copies of the work
for temporary use by the viewers.
How the present law might apply to such public displays is some-
what conjectural. The display of a visual image is hardly a "per-
formance" in any established meaning of that term. The projection of an
image might conceivably be treated as making a copy,22 but an
evanescent image lacks the element of durable fixation that is tradi-
22 Projection of a motion picture was held to infringe the right to "copy" in Pat-
terson v. Century Productions, 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655
(1938).
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tionally assumed to be inherent in the law's use of the word "copy."
Moreover, the circumstances in which visual material is displayed may
call for different qualifications from those provided for either per-
formance or copying. The right of public display needs to be dealt
with on its own merits in a revision of the law.
3. Community Antenna Systems
An issue that has only recently demanded attention concerns the
retransmission of television broadcasts by so-called community antenna
(CATV) systems. These systems pick up broadcasts on high antennas,
and relay them, through amplifiers and a web of cables, to the re-
ceiving sets of individual subscribers. Originally CATV systems were
designed to bring local broadcasts into the pockets where reception was
blocked by mountains or other conditions of terrain. They spread next
into areas where reception was limited, or of poor quality, for lack of
nearby broadcasting stations. The concern of copyright owners, as well
as of broadcasters, became acute when CATV began to bring programs
from distant stations into areas served by local stations, thereby
diverting some of the local station's audience and, in consequence,
diminishing the value of copyright licenses to the local station.
CATV operators took the position that their retransmission of the
copyrighted material in broadcasts was not subject to copyright since
they were doing nothing more than furnishing antenna equipment to
their subscribers. The copyright owner of a number of motion pictures
brought suit for infringement on the ground that CATV retransmissions
of broadcasts of their motion pictures constituted public performances
under the present copyright law. In a seventy-six page opinion, Judge
Herlands of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York sustained the contention of the copyright owner.2 3 An appeal
from his decision is now pending.
There are thought to be sound reasons of equity and public policy
for treating CATV retransmissions differently in various situations.
For example, the impact of CATV on the value of a copyright license
to a local broadcaster is quite different in the situation where the CATV
augments the broadcaster's audience by bringing its programs into local
areas blocked out by the terrain, than it is in the situation where the
CATV takes away the broadcaster's audience by importing the same
programs from distant stations. Judicial application of the present
law, however, seems certain to mean that CATV systems are fully
liable in all cases if Judge Herlands' decision is upheld, or that they are
23 United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
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not liable in any case if he is reversed. Any intermediate solution that
would differentiate between various situations would appear to call for
legislative formulation, and such a solution has been proposed as part
of the revision of the copyright law."'
H. Computer Uses
Is the development of computer technology for storing and re-
producing documentay material, coupled with transmission systems for
reproduction at a distance, about to usher in something really new under
the sun? Or is the outgrowth of this technological marvel to be fore-
seen as just another, much faster way of doing the same things that
publishers and libraries, for instance, have been doing by more tradi-
tional methods?
These questions, of course, will not bring forth categorical answers,
but they may serve to indicate the wide range of prophetic thinking
that colors discussions of copyright in relation to computer-based
systems for storing and communicating information. The copyright
problems in this area are themselves not clearly defined as yet; what
the nature of computer-based systems will be, and what uses they will
make of copyrighted material in the future, can now only generally be
predicted.
Some broad aspects of future probabilities, however, seem fairly
apparent. For example, however effective the new machines may even-
tually be in communicating verbal, pictorial, and aural expressions
of thought instantaneously to almost everybody, the creation of those
expressions is still expected to depend upon the work and skill of
human authors. Similarly, even though the publishers' functions with
respect to the distribution of copies may be performed through the
medium of a computer-based system of reproduction and transmission,
some of their other functions-planning and commissioning works,
evaluating manuscripts and editing them-require human ingenuity
and judgment of a creative order. In short, computer-based systems of
dissemination will not affect the fundamental rationale of copyright;
they will not eliminate the need to provide an economic base that will
enable authors and publishers (whether of the present or a new breed)
to devote their time and resources to the production of the material to
be so disseminated.
Insofar as computer uses of copyrighted materials are comparable
in purpose and effect to uses by other, more familiar means-including
reproduction by copying machines and transmission by broadcasting-
the copyright principles found through experience to be appropriate for
24 See infra, notes 80-83.
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such other means of use may be presumed to be appropriate also for
similar uses by computer systems. Thus, it may be presumed that if
reproduction by traditional methods is subject to copyright, the same
reproduction by means of a computer should be also; and that what-
ever is permissible as fair use in copying by other devices should be
fair use when done by a computer.
It may be that future developments in computer technology will
bring about such new uses of copyrighted materials as will require
a special set of new copyright rules. But it is not yet evident that the
rules of general applicability based on uses and devices known hereto-
fore will not be appropriate for adaptation to computer uses.
I. Mass Licensing
The planning of projects for the development of computer-based
networks for communicating information has given further emphasis
to a practical problem that began to arouse serious attention a few
years ago in the context of the rapidly growing use of more and more
efficient photocopying machines. The problem is that of licensing the
use of copyrighted materials on a mass basis, so that users will have
ready access to the whole catalog of works and the copyright owners
will be compensated for the use of their respective works. The mass
licensing systems that have existed for many years in the field of
music25 might serve as prototypes for organizations dealing with other
kinds of works. Several groups have begun working on plans for
establishing a mass-licensing system for a broad range of books and
periodicals. They are approaching the problem as one calling for
voluntary action by the groups concerned rather than legislation.
J. The Jukebox Exemption
No summary of the issues requiring attention in a revision of the
copyright law could purport to cover the highlights without some
mention of the present exemption of musical performances by means of
coin-operated machines.26 This "jukebox" exemption was written into
the 1909 law in the closing days of the lengthy legislative proceedings,
as a rather casual addition, apparently thought to be of little signifi-
cance, to a final compromise on the major issue of the extension of
copyright to the mechanical recording of music.
25 Virtually all copyrighted music is licensed for public performance in bulk by
three organizations, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SESAC, Inc. Each organization issues li-
censes covering its entire catalog of music at a total annual fee.
26 17 U.S.C. § l(e), last sentence.
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The complete exemption of what has since grown into a half-
billion-dollar industry, whose sole business is the public performance of
music, has been recognized as an unjust anomaly by virtually everyone
except the jukebox industry itself. It is frequently cited by the copy-
right owner groups as the horrible example when they argue against
new proposals to exempt some particular use from copyright.
Special bills for the repeal of the exemption have been introduced
in Congress repeatedly during the past twenty years, and several of
them have been the subject of Congressional hearings." The jukebox
operators have pleaded that their industry has been based on the ex-
emption, and that the economic situation of most operators would not
allow them to pay more than a small sum as copyright royalties.
II. REviSION IN PROCESS
The current project for general revision of the copyright law has
been especially notable in two respects: (1) Few legislative measures
have had the thorough, patient study and discussion that went into the
almost ten years of preparatory work which preceded the introduction
in 1965 of a revision bill for Congressional consideration; (2) The
dedicated and perceptive devotion of a full panel of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee to twenty-two days of hearings on the bill,
and thereafter to fifty-one executive sessions at which the Subcommittee
made a painstaking review and analysis of every issue raised during and
after the hearings, is a model of the legislative process at its best.
A. Preparatory Work
The revision project began in 1955, under a Congressional author-
ization, with a program of studies inspired by the late Arthur Fisher,
then Register of Copyrights, and carried out in consultation with an
advisory panel of specialists broadly representative of the various
groups for whom copyright is a matter of major concern. The planning
of a program of studies on the important substantive issues, and of
conferences with all interested groups, a process that would obviously
take several years, was prompted by the hope that most of the con-
troversies, including a number that had frustrated the continuous
27 Among others, Hearings on H.R. 5921 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6 (1959); Hearings on H.R. 5174
Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 2 (1963). On the basis of the latter hearings a further bill, H.R. 7194, was
favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee: H.R. Rep. No. 733, 88th Cong.,
1st sess. (1963).
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efforts made between 1924 and 1940 to revise the 1909 law,2 8 could be
resolved before a bill was presented to Congress for its consideration.
Thirty-four studies were prepared by or under the direction of the
Copyright Office, ranging over the broad field of the major issues that
required attention in reconstructing the existing law. They were de-
signed to present objectively, with respect to each of the topics covered,
the history and status of the present law, the problems being en-
countered under the present law, the pertinent law in other countries,
and an analysis of the issues and suggested solutions. The thirty-four
studies, together with comments and views submitted by the members
of the advisory panel, were published in a series of pamphlets issued in
1960 and 1961 by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary."'
A Report of the Register of Copyrights, based on the studies and
making tentative recommendations as to the substantive provisions to
be incorporated in a draft of a revision bill, was in the process of prep-
aration when Arthur Fisher died rather suddenly near the end of 1960.
The Report was completed under his successor, Abraham L. Kamin-
stein, the present Register of Copyrights. It was submitted to the Con-
gress in July 1961, and was printed that same month by the House
Committee on the Judiciary.30
The new Register of Copyrights brought fresh impetus to the pro-
gram begun by his predecessor. His Report to the Congress was widely
distributed with an invitation to all persons concerned to submit
comments and suggestions, and during the following eight months he
convened four meetings of an enlarged panel of copyright specialists
for a critical discussion of the tentative recommendations advanced in
the Report. The transcript of the discussion at those meetings and a
substantial volume of comments submitted in response to the general
invitation were published by the House Committee on the Judiciary in
February 1963. 31
28 These earlier efforts to revise -the law are reviewed in Goldman, "The History of
U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954" (1955), Study No. 1 in Copyright
Law Revision Studies.
29 The thirty-four studies and a subject index were issued in a series of twelve
Committee Prints under the running title of Copyright Law Revision Studies (Senate
Committee on the judiciary 86th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., 1960-61). Among the thirty-four
studies are those referred to in notes 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 21, and 28, supra, and notes
55, 56, 87, 89, 91, and 95, infra.
3o Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the Copyright Law (Comm. Print, House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1961).
31 Copyright Law Revision, Pt. 2 (Comm. Print, House Committee on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1963).
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The Copyright Office proceeded next to prepare a preliminary
draft of provisions in legislative language for incorporation in a revision
bill. In a number of important respects the preliminary draft differed in
substance from the tentative recommendations in the Register's Report;
these changes reflected the analysis and consideration by the Register
and his staff of the many suggestions offered in the discussions and
comments on the Report. The preliminary draft, in turn, was subjected
to discussion in detail by a further enlarged panel of specialists at eight
meetings convened over a period of a year, and was circulated to other
interested persons for their comments. The transcript of those eight
meetings and the comments received were published by the House
Committee on the Judiciary in two prints issued in July and December
196432
The response to the preliminary draft was encouraging. A con-
sensus appeared to be taking shape on many of the issues that had been
sharply controversial, and while there were still a number of conflicts
on essential points, the contending groups were manifesting their
willingness to seek mutual accommodations or to consider compro-
mises.3 In this hopeful atmosphere the process of formulating proposals
and eliciting discussion among interested persons was carried out once
more. In the light of the views expressed on the preliminary draft, the
Copyright Office prepared a new draft in the form of a complete bill,
which was introduced in the Congress in July 1964,1" as a basis for a
final round of meetings, comments, and suggestions.
The discussions and comments on the 1964 draft bill, which were
printed by the House Judiciary Committee in September 1965,11 pointed
the way to the conclusion of the preparatory work. The Copyright
Office drafted and submitted the bill that was introduced on February
4, 1965-as H.R. 4347 and S. 1006 in the 89th Congress-for Con-
gressional consideration. The Register of Copyrights also submitted, in
May 1965, his Supplementary Report explaining the provisions of the
bill in detail, which the House Judiciary Committee published that
same month.30 The next phase of the revision project-Congressional
hearings on the bill-was now about to begin.
32 Copyright Law Revision, pts. 3 & 4 (Comm. Prints, House Committee on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1964).
33 In any adequate history of the revision effort, a full chapter could well be de-
voted to the vital contributions made by many members of the bar and of industry and
scholarly groups, in meetings and conferences among themselves and with the Copyright
Office, toward resolving knotty problems and reconciling conflicts.
34 H.R. 11947 and S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
35 Copyright Law Revision, pt. 5 (Comm. Print, House Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965).
36 Copyright Law Revision, pt. 6 (Comm. Print, House Committee on the judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965).
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B. Congressional Proceedings
As already noted, the revision project was inaugurated by a Con-
gressional authorization of the study program in 1955. The studies
produced under that program were published by the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary in 1960 and 1961, and the subsequent reports of the
Register of Copyrights, as well as the discussions and comments on the
successive proposals and drafts, were published by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary between 1961 and 1965. In both houses the
Judiciary subcommittee in charge of copyright matters maintained its
interest in the revision project and kept in touch with the developments
throughout the course of the preparatory work.
In his 1961 Report, the Register of Copyrights had recommended
that the term of copyright be lengthened in the revision bill and, more
particularly, that twenty years be added to the renewal term of all
subsisting (as well as future) copyrights. This recommendation to
extend the renewal term of subsisting copyrights gained general ap-
proval and, on the premise that a general revision bill providing for such
an extension would eventually be enacted, Congress passed a joint
resolution, approved September 19, 1962, which preserved until De-
cember 31, 1965, those copyrights subsisting in their renewal term on
the date of approval that would otherwise expire before December 31,
1965." When it became apparent that adoption of a general revision
bill would not be accomplished by the end of 1965, renewal copyrights
that would otherwise expire in the meantime were extended until
December 31, 1967, by another joint resolution approved August 28,
1965.38
Congressional consideration of the 1965 bill for general revision
began on May 26, 1965, with the opening of hearings on H.R. 4347
(and other identical bills) before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary. The hearings continued for twenty-two
days through September 2, 1965; the record of the hearings, as printed
in three volumes, covers more than 1900 pages. 9 The hearings were re-
markable, not only in length and thoroughness, but more strikingly for
the constancy and devoted interest of the members of the Subcom-
mittee-both the majority members led by Representative Robert W.
Kastenmeier who served as chairman of the Subcommittee, and the
minority members led by Representative Richard H. Poff-for their
37 PL. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962).
38 P.L. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (1965).
89 Hearings on Copyright Law Revision Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pts. 1-3 (1966).
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grasp of the complex issues and their penetrating questions and
observations, and for the atmosphere of searching objectivity main-
tained by them throughout.
Even more extraordinary was the dedicated manner in which the
members of the Subcommittee thereafter devoted so many of their
busy hours to considering the provisions of the bill in the light of the
hearings, and their determined commitment to working out the best
possible bill. At the request of the Subcommittee, the Copyright Office
collaborated with the Subcommittee's staff in presenting summations
of all the suggestions and arguments advanced during and after the
hearings for amendment of the bill. Between February and September
of 1966 the Subcommittee met in fifty-one executive sessions (probably
some kind of record), at which it weighed the arguments on every
suggestion put forward, and decided upon the amendments to be
adopted.4
0
The Subcommittee reported the bill (H.R. 4347) with its amend-
ments to the full Judiciary Committee on September 28, 1966, and the
full Committee in turn, on October 12, 1966, approved the amended
bill and submitted its Report in which some 130 pages are devoted to a
detailed analysis and discussion of the bill, section by section.41
The Committee amendments were fairly numerous and some of
them were of major importance. On the whole, however, the basic
framework of the bill as introduced remained intact.
There was no time during the few remaining days of the 89th
Congress for further action on the bill. The 90th Congress may be
expected to proceed from where the 89th left off.
40 On August 9, 1966, when the series of executive sessions were nearing their end,
Mr. Kaminstein, in speaking at a luncheon meeting of the American Bar Association's
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law in Montreal, observed:
As things now stand, and make no mistake about this, most of the members of
the Subcommittee know more about the copyright law than the majority of the
people in this room, and they know a good deal more about the revision bill
than most copyright lawyers.
41 H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
On the Senate side in the 89th Congress, the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Judiciary Committee held initial hearings on S. 1006 (identical
with H.R. 4347) for three days in August 1965. After that the Senate Subcommittee
apparently decided to defer any further hearings until the House Subcommittee had
completed its work on the bill. In response to a special request by community antenna
television operators, who began seeking legislative relief from judge Herlands' decision
in United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corporation, 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), the Senate Subcommittee held hearings for three days in August 1966 confined to
the question of CATV liability under S. 1006.
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III. THE PENDING REVISION BILL
At the time of this writing (January 1967) the 90th Congress has
just opened, and the copyright law revision bill (H.R. 4347) as
amended and reported by the House Judiciary Committee near the close
of the 89th Congress has been introduced as H.R. 2512 and S. 597 in
the 90th Congress. It is the bill in this latest form, the product of eleven
years of concerted efforts, to which we now turn our attention. It is not
possible, within the compass of this article, to deal with all of the
important provisions of the bill, or even to review all of the significant
changes it would effect in the present law. All that will be essayed here
is a summary of the bill's treatment of the main issues calling for new
departures from the present law.
A. Coverage Under the Statute
Some of the more radical innovations of the bill relate to the
coverage of works of authorship under the copyright protection afforded
by the federal statute. Here the bill reaches into new ground in three
respects: (1) in its coverage of works in their unpublished state; (2)
in its coverage of works fixed in new forms or by new techniques,
including any now unknown that may be developed in the future; and
(3) in its coverage of new kinds of works. o
1. Unpublished Works
Instead of the present dual system of common law protection
before publication and statutory copyright thereafter, the bill would
institute a single federal system of copyright protection for works of
authorship as soon as they are created, i.e., as soon as they are "fixed
in any tangible medium of expression."" Thus, unpublished works
that now depend for their protection upon the common law (or the rare
statutes) of the several states would be protected instead by copyright
under the federal statute. Federal copyright protection would apply
automatically upon creation (i.e., fixation) of the work; within the
area of federal protection, any equivalent protection under state law
would be pre-empted.43
State law would be left in effect, however, with respect to un-
published material of any kind that is not subject to copyright protec-
tion under the federal statute. This would embrace material that does
not qualify as a "work of authorship" under the statute (of which
42 The bill provides that "Copyright in a work . . . subsists from its creation," §
302(a). A definition in § 101 specifies that "A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a
copy or phonorecord for the first time."
43 Pre-emption is provided for in § 301.
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typography, most industrial designs, and products of mechanical opera-
tions might be examples), and material in the nature of a "work of
authorship" that is not "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" (of
which impromptu speeches, musical or choreographic improvisations,
and broadcast emissions might be examples)."
Also, the pre-emptive effect of the federal statute would not
intrude upon causes of action under state laws relating to rights that are
not equivalent to copyright, though they may involve copyrighted
material. As examples of such causes of action, the bill mentions
"breaches of contract, breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defama-
tion, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false repre-
sentation."4
2. Works in New Forms
The advent of each new physical form in which works are fixed
has been a recurrent source of difficulty or uncertainty as to the applica-
tion of the copyright statute to a work in that form. Thus, music fixed
only in an aural recording (which is characteristic of "concrete" and
"electronic" music) is still considered ineligible for copyright protec-
tion under the present statute; to become eligible to music must be
written in some form of visual notation. 6 When a series of pictures that
would undoubtedly have constituted a copyrightable "motion picture"
if fixed on film was fixed instead on the newly developed videotape,
there were differing views for a time as to its copyrightability. And
even now the copyrightability of "literary" material incorporated in a
computer program on magnetic tape or punched cards is considered
debatable, though there would be no doubt about the same material in
a printed book."
Questions of this character have arisen from a failure to differen-
tiate between the intangible work itself (i.e., the author's intellectual
creation which is the true object of copyright protection) and the
tangible form in which the work is fixed and from which it can be
perceived or made perceptible. To a large extent this confusion may be
traced to the historical identification of works in terms of the "copies"
in which they were reproduced and published. Thus, the copyright
statutes have traditionally referred to "books" in specifying the subject
matter of copyright, rather than to the, literary, pictorial, or other
4 Section 301(b) (1).
45 Section 301(b) (3).
46 The Copyright Office will not accept aural recordings in fulfilment of the re-
quirement in 17 U.S.C. §§ 12-14 that "copies" be deposited for registration.
47 The Copyright Office has registered copyright claims on motion pictures embodied
in videotape and on literary material incorporated in computer programs.
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content that constituted the copyrightable work of authorship. In the
much-cited case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,
48
decided shortly before the passage of the 1909 Copyright Act, the
Supreme Court held that the exclusive right of the copyright owner of
a musical work to make "copies" did not extend to the making of piano
rolls from which the music could be played but not read, since "copies"
meant reproductions of the work in a visually perceptible form. And
the 1909 Act as codified in the present law (though it overturned the
result of White-Smith by providing specifically for the right to make
any form of "record" from which the work could be reproduced) still
reflects some confusion between works and the physical forms in which
they are embodied. It continues to specify categories of copyrightable
works in terms of "books," "periodicals," and "prints," among others,
49
and it requires that "copies" (a term for which no definition is given to
repudiate the premise stated in White-Smith) must be deposited for
copyright registration. 0
The revision bill would put an end to this conceptual confusion.
It covers all "original works of authorship" that are fixed "in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."'" Moreover, in
its illustrative list of "works of authorship," the bill characterizes
the works according to their intrinsic nature (e.g., "literary works")
rather than the physical forms of their fixation. 2 There would thus be
no doubt about the coverage under the bill of a musical composition
embodied in a tape recording, or a motion picture fixed on videotape,
or a literary work embodied in a computer program on punched cards,
or of any work of authorship eligible for protection that might hereafter
be fixed in some new form now unknown.
48 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
49 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1947).
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 12-14 (1947).
51 Section 102, first sentence. This is buttressed by the definitions in § 101, which
state that a work may be "fixed" in either "copies" or "phonorecords," and which de-
fine the latter two terms as including between them all "material objects" in which a
work is fixed "by any method now known or later developed," and from which the work
"can be perceived, reproduced, or 'otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device."
52 Section 102, second sentence. In its definitions of categories of works, the bill
cites as examples various physical forms in which the works may be embodied. Thus,
the definition in § 101 of "Literary works" includes the phrase "regardless of the nature
of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, or film,
in which they are embodied."
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3. New Kinds of Works
The bill lists seven categories of protected works,53 the first six
of which are designed to include all of the works embraced within the
thirteen classes enumerated in the present statute." Thus, all of the
kinds of works now eligible for copyright protection would continue to
be protected. And one of the first six categories in the bill-"panto-
mimes and choreographic works"--would be an expansion of the
corresponding class covered by the present law since such works must
now be "dramatic" to qualify for copyright.5
The seventh category of protected works named in the bill-
"sound recordings"-is entirely new. 6 A work of this category consists
of the concatenation of actual sounds fixed in, and capable of aural
reproduction from, some form of "phonorecord." The recorded sounds
that constitute, in combination and in sequence, a "sound recording"
are most commonly derived from musical instruments or human singing
or speech; but they may be also derived from nature (e.g., bird calls),
from machines (e.g., train whistles, racing motors, or electronic
devices) or from any other source.
A sound recording as a work in itself is separate and distinct from
the musical composition (or literary work) of which a particular
rendition is recorded. The distinction becomes clearer when it is
remembered that a musical composition is an intellectual conception
created by its composer and usually exists before and independently
of any recording, while a sound recording is made by capturing a series
of actual sounds which are produced, where a musical composition is
being used, by performers, or which may consist of sounds other than
music. A sound recording as a work must also be distinguished from
the "phonorecord" in which it is embodied, the distinction being
parallel with that between a literary work and the book in which it is
embodied.
With these distinctions in mind, it will be evident that a phono-
record may embody both a musical composition and a sound recording
as two separate works; and even where the musical composition is in
3 Section 102.
17 U.S.C. § 5 (1947).
55 The present law does not mention pantomimes or choreographic works. They
may qualify if they come within the class of "dramatic or dramatico-musical composi-
tions" specified in 17 U.S.C. § 5, but whether modem "abstract" dances would so
qualify is questionable. See Varmer, "Copyright in Choreographic Works" (1959), Study
No. 28 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
56 For a discussion of the protection of sound recordings, see Ringer, "The Un-
authorized Duplication of Sound Recordings" (1957), Study No. 26 in Copyright Law
Revision Studies.
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the public domain, as in the case where a performance of a Beethoven
sonata is recorded, the sound recording may be subject to copyright.
While recognizing sound recordings as works protected by copy-
right for the first time, the bill would limit the rights granted to the
copyright owner. He would be given only the exclusive rights to repro-
duce the sound recording and to distribute reproductions of it to the
public." Reproduction here means duplication of the actual sounds
fixed in the protected recording. The copyright would not preclude
other persons from making other recordings of similar sounds, such as
those produced by another performance that imitated the one fixed in
the protected recording.
Of particular importance to the various users of recorded music,
including broadcasters and the operators of jukeboxes and other music
services, is the express denial in the bill of any exclusive right in the
copyright owner of a sound recording to use it in giving public per-
formances.5" Under the present law the performance right of the copy-
right owners of musical or literary works extends to peformances by
means of phonorecords, and the bill states explicitly that their perfor-
mance right continued unimpaired. 9
B. Duration:
1. Future Copyrights
The change wrought by the revision bill that is probably the most
significant in the minds of authors generally is the adoption of the basic
term of copyright prevalent in most other countries: a single term en-
during for the life of the author and fifty years after his death.60 In
most instances this term will be substantially longer than the two terms
totaling fifty-six years after publication provided by the present law;
however, for the relatively small number of works published posthu-
mously (or very shortly before the author's death), the new term will
be shorter; and for works that remain unpublished, it will put a ter-
minus to protection that now continues indefinitely.
The life-plus-fifty-years term cannot be applied universally. In
the cases of anonymous and pseudonymous works, as well as of "works
made for hire" (which are usually produced and issued in the name of
an organization), there is ordinarily no identified author upon whose life
the term can be measured. For these works the bill (§ 302 (c)) provides
a term of seventy-five years after publication, based upon a study
57 Section 114.
58 Section 114(a).
69 Section 114(c).
60 Section 302.
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indicating that this period is roughly equivalent on the average to fifty
years after the author's death.61 And still another term is needed for
works of unidentified authors that remain unpublished for a long time;
so the bill (§ 302(c) ) provides for a term of one hundred years from
creation of the work if that is shorter than seventy-five years from
publication.
Because of the persistent doubt that the death date of obscure
authors could be readily ascertained, the bill contains a novel qualifica-
tion on the life-plus-fifty-years term. The Copyright Office is to main-
tain a record of authors' death dates and, unless the record shows other-
wise, it may be presumed, after a period of seventy-five years from
publication or one hundred years from creation of the work, that an
author has been dead for fifty years.6
2. Subsisting Copyrights
The foregoing term provisions would apply only to copyrights
that come into existence after the new law becomes effective. Copyrights
now subsisting are so often the subject of contracts and vested or
future interests based upon the renewal system of the present law that
it was felt essential to retain that system for them. Hence, subsisting
copyrights would continue under the bill to have a first term of 28
years from publication and to be subject to renewal by the persons
specified in the present law; but the renewal term would be lengthened
from the present twenty-eight years to forty-seven years, making the
total of the two terms seventy-five years from publication (and so
equivalent to the term for future copyrights).63
3. Termination of Author's Assignment
In lieu of the opportuntiy afforded to authors (or the dependents
of deceased authors) under the present renewal system, to recapture
their previously assigned copyrights at the end of the first term of
twenty-eight years, the bill gives them the option to terminate their
assignments by serving a notice in advance after thirty-five years (or
up to forty years in certain cases) from the execution of the assign-
ment.6 This is designed to enable the author (or his surviving family)
61 The results of this study are summarized in the 1961 Report of the Register of
Copyrights, op. cit. supra note 30, at 50.
62 Sections 302(d)-(e).
63 Sections 304(a)-(b). To assure that existing contracts and interests based upon
the present renewal system will not be disurbed, § 304(a) of the bill duplicates the lan-
guage of the present 17 U.S.C. § 24, except for changing the length of the renewal term
from 28 to 47 years.
14 Section 203 provides for termination of transfers and licenses executed by au-
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to renegotiate contracts of assignment made when he was in a dis-
advantageous bargaining position and when the economic value of his
work was conjectural.
C. Notice of Copyright
The bill retains the requirement, firmly established for so long in
our copyright law, that a prescribed notice of copyright must be placed
on all published copies of the work.65 The bill makes major changes in
the notice requirement, however, by relaxing its present rigidity and
ameliorating the harsh consequences of omissions and errors.
Where omission of the notice will now result in the irretrievable
loss of copyright, the bill would preserve the copyright if a registration
is made before or within five years after copies have been published
without the notice.66 The notice requirement would be given force at
the same time, however, by absolving from liability for damages any
innocent infringer who is misled by the absence of the notice. 7
Similarly, if a person who is not the actual owner is named in the
notice, the copyright may be forfeited under the present law. Here, too,
the bill would preserve the copyright, but would protect from liability
innocent infringers who act in good faith in reliance upon the apparent
ownership of the person named in the notice." The rule regarding the
wrong name in the notice may be crucial, for example, in the situation
where the author of a contribution to a magazine wishes to retain the
copyright in his article, while the only notice in the magazine relates
to its contents as a whole and is in the name of the publisher. The bill
makes special reference to this latter situation."
Copyrights are now put in jeopardy if the notice is placed in a
position other than one specified precisely by the present law. The bill
adopts the approach taken in the Universal Copyright Convention by
allowing the notice to be placed "in such manner and position as to give
reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. 7 0
thors after the new law becomes effective. Section 304(c) provides for termination, with
respect to the 19-year period added to the renewal term of subsisting copyrights, of
transfers and licenses executed before the effective date of the new law.
65 Section 401. A similar notice requirement is added by § 402 for the new category
of sound recordings.
66 Section 404(a).
67 Section 404(b).
68 Section 405.
69 Section 403.
70 Section 401(c), which provides further that placement of the notice in accordance
with regulations to be prescribed by the Register of Copyrights will satisfy the require-
ment.
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D. Uses Subject to Copyright
1. In General
The bill specifies, as exclusive rights of the copyright owner, the
four broad ways of exploiting works that are designated in the present
statute: (1) their reproduction in copies or phonorecords, (2) their
use as the basis for derivative works, (3) the publication of copies or
phonorecords, and (4) their public performance. In addition, the bill
provides explicitly for the exploitation of works through public display,
a method to which television has given new importance but which the
present statute leaves in a nebulous state. The most significant provi-
sions of the bill in regard to these various methods of use are those
specifying exemptions from, and limitations on, these exclusive rights
of the copyright owner.71 Some of the more important exemptions and
limitations will be summarized (and somewhat oversimplified) here.
2. Fair Use
The bill contains, for the first time, a statutory recognition of the
doctrine of "fair use" which has evolved in a line of judicial pronounce-
ments. The doctrine (that certain limited uses of copyrighted material
are freely permissible as "fair use") has important applications in vir-
tually every area of use. In framing the revision bill the limits of fair
use became the center of sharp controversy in the context of repro-
ducing material for use in schools. After much shifting and hauling in
attempts to draft a statutory formulation of what is innately a doctrine
of imprecise dimensions, the bill finally arrived at a statement 2 which,
as supplemented by explanatory examples in the legislative report of
the House Judiciary Committee 7 3 seems to have resolved the contro-
versy.
The bill recognizes explicitly that, within the bounds of fair use
generally, copying (as well as other uses) "for purposes such as crit-
icism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research"
may be fair use. This is not, of course, an exhaustive list of the purposes
to which the doctrine may be applied. The bill then states four main
factors, which are a crystallization of the criteria gleaned from the
court decisions, to be considered in determining whether any particular
use is pemissible as a fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the
use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and sub-
71 The exclusive rights are stated in all-embracng terms in § 106; the exemptions
and limitations are then specified in §§ 107-116.
72 Section 107.
73 H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 58-66 (1966).
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stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
3. Nonprofit Performances
In general, the bill continues the present law's exemption from
copyright of public performances of nondramatic musical and literary
works that are given in the presence of the audience with no element
of profit-seeking involved.7" But the bill repudiates the extension of this
exemption to all noncommercial broadcasts of such works, which is be-
lieved to be the effect of the broad language used in the 1909 law.
Instead, the bill distinguishes generally between instructional broad-
casts that noncommercial educational stations provide for reception
primarily in schools (or by students unable to attend classes) as part
of the schools' regular instructional activities, and cultural or entertain-
ment programs broadcast by those or other stations for reception by the
general public. Subject to certain qualifications, the former are exempt 75
while the latter are not.
4. "Ephemeral Recordings"
Taking a leaf out of foreign laws and, to some extent, giving sanc-
tion to a common practice, the bill contains a new provision permitting
a broadcaster, when he is authorized to broadcast a work, to make a
single recording (aural or visual) of the program including the work
for the purpose of later authorized broadcasts. The recording could be
used only for broadcasts made by that particular broadcaster within six
months after the first such use. 6 Special rules for instructional broad-
casts to schools by noncommercial educational stations would permit
74 Section 110(4). The exemption does not apply if compensation for the perfor-
mance is paid to any performer, promoter, or organizer. The charge of an admission fee
will not of itself negate the exemption if the net proceeds are used exclusively for elee-
mosynary purposes.
The bill also provides specifically for the exemption of performances and displays
made by instructors or pupils in the course of classroom teaching (§ 110(1)), and those
made in the course of church services (§ 110(3)).
75 Section 110(2). The exemption applies to performances of nondramatic literary or
musical works, and displays of any kinds of works, in such instructional broadcasts made
by a governmental body or other nonprofit organization. In order to exclude national
and wide regional network broadcasts, § 110(2) limits the exempt broadcasts to those
that are not normally received beyond a radius of 100 miles. Also specifically excluded
from the exemption are transmissions from an information storage and retrieval center
which are activated by the recipients.
76 Section 112(a). The recording could be preserved solely for archival purposes
after the six months; otherwise it would be destroyed.
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a recording made by one such station to be used for such broadcasts
by itself or any other such station within one year after its first use."
For the making or use of recordings beyond the limits allowed by this
statutory exemption, authorization by the copyright owner would be
necessary.
5. Public Displays
Broadly speaking, the bill would subject the right of public display
to much the same exemptions and limitations as the right of public per-
formance. Any person who owns a lawfully made copy of a work (in-
cluding the original of a work such as a painting) would be entitled to
display it for viewing by the public at the place where the copy is lo-
cated." This would permit display of the copy in a public gallery or
show window, for example, but would not permit display of the work
in a broadcast or other television transmission to the public. In general,
in those situations where television performances are permitted-e.g.,
in noncommercial instructional broadcasts for schools, in the public
reception of television broadcasts on a single home-style receiver, and
in certain retransmissions of television broadcasts-television displays
are likewise permitted.7 9
6. Retransmissions by Community Antenna Systems
On the hotly disputed issue of CATV liability for the retransmis-
sion of broadcasts of copyrighted works, the bill stands in the middle
between the initial contention of copyright owner groups for full li-
ability and the initial plea of CATV systems for complete exemption.
Subject to certain conditions that would deny any exemption to a
CATV system engaged in transmission activities other than relaying
broadcasts,"° the bill would exempt CATV retransmissions that are con-
fined within the area normally expected to be reached by the broadcast
itself;8  this pertains particularly to the pockets in the area which are
cut off from receiving the broadcast by the terrain or other physical
obstructions. In an area that is not "adequately served" (one not re-
ceiving through local broadcasting stations most of the national net-
works' programs) a CATV system would be given a compulsory li-
77 Section 112(b). For such instruction broadcasts (which are exempt under § 110(2)
as to the rights of performance and display), the noncommercial station could make a
duplicate recording for security and archival preservation.
78 Section 109(b). The display could be made either by showing the copy itself or
by projecting a single image of it.
79 See §§ 110(2), 110M(), 111(a).
80 Section 111(b)(1)-(4).
81 Section 111(a) (3).
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cense, for which it would have to pay a "reasonable license fee," to
bring into the area a broadcast from an outside station, except where
the CATV had been notified that the same program is licensed ex-
clusively to a local station for that area.82 In other cases-in an "ade-
quately served" area, or where the CATV had been notified of a local
station's exclusive license-CATV retransmission of a broadcast from
an outside station would be fully subject to copyright.3
7. Jukebox Performance of Music
The bill would end the jukebox exemption under the present law;
but it would give jukebox operators a compulsory license, for which
the operator would have to furnish periodically information identifying
his machines and the musical works placed in them, and would have to
pay a royalty fixed in the statute.84 As in any other case, the operators
could negotiate with the copyright owners for licenses on any terms
they agree upon, instead of invoking the compulsory license under the
statutory conditions.
E. Miscellany
Any number of other features of the revision bill might be worth
noting in a fuller review. Within the limits of this article, only a few
will be mentioned here in passing.
1. Manufacturing Clause
A substantially curtailed "manufacturing clause" persists in the
bill85 as an avowed compromise. The requirement that copies be manu-
factured in the United States would be a good deal narrower than it
is now with respect to the kinds of works affected, the conditions under
which domestic manufacture would be required, and the extent to
which copyright protection would be withheld for failure to comply.
2. Compulsory License for Recording of Music
The bill 6 continues in modified form the present provisions"
enabling any person to make "mechanical recordings" (phonorecords)
of music when such recordings have once been authorized. In addition
82 Section 111(c).
83 Section III(b)(5)-(6).
84 Section 116.
85 Section 601.
86 Section 115.
87 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(e) and 101(e). The present compulsory license provisions and the
problems they present are discussed in Henn, "The Compulsory License Provisions of the
U.S. Copyright Law" (1956), Study No. 5 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
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to clarifying uncertainties as to how broadly the compulsory license
applies, the bill would help to resolve some of the difficulties of en-
forcement now encountered by copyright owners, particularly by
making available the usual remedies for infringement instead of the
special limited remedies now provided. The bill would also raise the
rate of the statutory royalty to be paid in the absence of different terms
in a negotiated license.s8
3. "Government Publications"
The statute now prohibits copyright in "any publication of the
United States Government," s9 but this term is not defined and there
are differences of opinion as to the proper scope of the prohibition. The
bill would clarify the matter by referring to the prohibited category
as "any work of the United States Government" and by defining that
term as "a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of his official duties."9 Incidentally, this would
continue to allow Government agencies to exercise discretion, when
they make contracts or grants under which copyrightable materials
may be produced, as to whether copyright in those products will be
permitted.
4. Divisibility of Copyright
A number of court decisions have enunciated the theory that a
copyright is an indivisible bundle of rights that can be owned as a
single unit only. This has resulted in some confusion regarding the effect
of grants, commonly made by authors or other copyright owners, of
the exclusive right to exploit a work in a particular manner (e.g., by
publishing copies, or by giving public performances) or in a particular
medium (e.g., publication in hard-cover books only, or in a periodical).9
The bill would settle the troublesome questions in this area by providing
explicitly for partial transfers of ownership,92 and for the right of a
partial owner to sue for infringement. 93
88 Instead of the present statutory rate of two cents per record of a composition,
the rate in the bill is two-and-one-half cents, or one-half cent per minute or playing
time, whichever is higher.
89 17 U.S.C. § 8. This subject is discussed in Berger, "Copyright in Government
Publications" (1959), Study No. 33 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
90 Section 105.
91 The problems raised by the theory of divisibility are discussed in Kaminstein,
"Divisibility of Copyrights" (1957), Study No. 11 in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
92 Section 201(d).
03 Section 501(b).
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5. Statutory Damages
In general, the bill"' maintains the remedial structure of the
present law which provides for the recovery of the damages caused by
an infringement and the infringer's profits, or, in lieu of actual damages
and profits, an award of statutory damages in a sum to be fixed by the
court within the range between a specified minimum and maximum 5
The bill keeps the statutory minimum at $250, but adds the new pro-
visos that the court may reduce the minimum to $100 against an in-
nocent infringer, and may remit statutory damages completely against
a teacher who reasonably believed that this infringing reproduction
of a work for classroom use was a fair use. The statutory maximum
would be raised from 5,000 to 10,000 dollars,9" and a new provision
would make this the total of the statutory damages allowable for mul-
tiple infringements (such as might occur in a network broadcast carried
by 200 stations).9 7
6. Computer Uses
The bill makes no special provisions for uses of copyrighted ma-
terial in computer systems. On this subject the House Judiciary Com-
mittee said in its report of October 12, 1966, on H.R. 4347:
In the context of section 106 which specifies the kinds of uses
that are subject to copyright, the committee believes that, instead of
trying to deal explicitly with computer uses, the statute should be
general in terms and broad enough to allow for adjustment to future
changes in patterns of reproduction and other uses of authors'
works....
In various discussions since the hearings, there have been pro-
posals for establishing voluntary licensing systems for computer
uses, and it was suggested that a commission be established to study
the problem and recommend definitive copyright legislative several
years from now. The committee expresses the hope that the interests
involved will work together toward an ultimate solution of this prob-
lem in the light of experience. Toward this end the Register of Copy-
94 Section 504.
95 These provisions in the present law, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b), are discussed in Strauss,
"The Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law" (1956), Study No. 22, and Brown,
"The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory
Study" (1958), Study No. 23, in Copyright Law Revision Studies.
96 The present law allows the court to exceed the maximum, without limit, for
infringements occurring after written notice has been served upon the defendant. 17
U.S.C. § 101(b). The bill provides instead for increasing the statutory damages up to
$20,000 for infringements proven to have been committed willfully: § 504(b) (2).
97 For examples of multiple infringement cases, see Davis v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours Co., 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Law v. National Broadcasting Co.,
51 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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right may find it appropriate to hold further meetings on this subject
after passage of the new law. In the meantime, however, section 106
preserves the exclusive rights of the copyright owner with respect to
reproductions of his work for input or storage in an information
system.9 8
CONCLUSION
Copyright law revision involves a host of problems of varying
magnitude, some resting on impalpable considerations, many having
complex ramifications, and often requiring a choice or compromise be-
tween conflicting interests. There were a number of skeptics who voiced
the thought, during the preparatory stages of the revision program,
that a comprehensive revision of the law, though badly needed, could
not be achieved in the welter of issues and disputes.
Eleven years of effort in which hundreds of persons have par-
ticipated, representing every interest concerned and every shade of
opinion, and climaxed by the painstaking attention of an informed Con-
gressional committee, have produced a revision bill that may ripen
before long into a legislative enactment.
Any one interest group can still point to some details in the present
bill that are not entirely to its liking; some of the provisions in the bill
represent compromises that do not comport with anyone's conception
of philosophically ideal solutions, and a few areas of controversy are
still smoldering and may flare up. On the whole, this writer believes
that the bill represents a fair balancing of the equities in the light of
our technology and knowledge of today and the foreseeable future, and
that its enactment would mark a great advance in the pursuit of the
Constitutional purpose, "To promote the Progress of Science ... by
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to
their... Writings .... "
98 H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 53-54 (1966).
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